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Summary
USA, Canada and Argentina have challenged before the World Trade Organisation the
European Communities’ (EC) denial of Genetically Modified (GM) product imports,
which took place from 1998 to 2004 .  Against this background, the goal of this paper is
twofold. Firstly, we will determine which WTO provisions would have been violated by
the EC. Secondly, we will highlight the dispute’s most important legal issues in order to
see to what extent the dispute might influence the ongoing trade and environment
debate. The paper concludes that the role of the precautionary principle in the
application of the EC legislation is one of the dispute’s main issues. Furthermore, the
Panel findings on the legal nature of the precautionary principle, and on its relevance for
the interpretation of WTO provisions, will finally determine the influence of the GMO
dispute on the trade and environment debate.
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On May 19, 2004 the European Commission approved the sale of Syngenta Bt-
11 sweet corn.
1 It has been the first Genetically Modified product (hereinafter ‘GM
product’) to be placed in the European market since 1998. Before that year more than
ten GM products had been granted market access in accordance with the European
Communities (hereinafter ‘EC’) approval procedure.
In the past few years political tension arose between the leading Genetically
Modified Organism (hereinafter ‘GMOs’) producers, such as the United States of
America (hereinafter ‘US’), Canada, Argentina, Egypt and Australia,
2 and the EC,
3
because the latter would have put in place a deliberate suspension of its own GMO
approval process, which negatively affected their exports to the European market. On
the one hand, it was argued that no new application was permitted and, on the other
hand, that the pending ones were deliberately not granted. In other words, according to
the GMO producer states, the EC has established a general moratoria for new GM
products and a product specific moratoria for those GM products, whose application
was still pending. Furthermore, several EC member states also established national
import bans on GM products.
This tension has finally led the GMO issue directly into the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (hereinafter ‘DSB’) agenda. In fact, in May 2003 the US, Canada and
Argentina (hereinafter ‘the Complainants’)
4  requested consultations to the EC about the
GM product import system in the European market, in accordance with Article 4.4 of
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (hereinafter ‘DSU’). The consultations
were held in Geneva on June 19, 2003 but they were unable to settle the dispute.
Therefore, the Complainants requested the DSB to establish a Panel to solve the
                                                
1  See “EC approves GM canned maize”, 4.10 BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest (2004) for the
‘bitter’ reactions in Europe to the approval of Syngenta Bt-11 sweet corn.
2  In 2001 the US, Argentina, Canada and China accounted for ninety-nine percent of the total land
area devoted to biotech products.
3  In the same year the EC only accounted for less than four-tenths of one percent of the worldwide
land area devoted to biotech products.
4 See  Doc.  WT/DS291/1,  European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products Request for Consultations by the United States, 20 May 2003; Doc.
WT/DS292/1,  European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products Request for Consultations by Canada, 20 May 2003; Doc. WT/DS293/1, European
Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products Request for
Consultations by Argentina, 20 May 2003.2
dispute.
5 The DSB, pursuant to the request of the three countries, established a single
panel on August 29, 2003.
6 However, due to disagreement among the parties in the
dispute on its composition, it was finally constituted only in March 2004.
7 The parties
have already sent their first submissions to the Panel, which has also already held oral
hearings. The panel’s decision was due in September 2004 but it has been postponed to
March 2005 because, in August 2004, the Panel announced that it would seek expert
advice on technical and scientific issues raised in the dispute.
8
Against this factual background, the goal of this paper is to analyse the possible
influence of the GMO dispute and of the legal issues therein on the ongoing trade and
environment debate within the WTO.
The first part of this paper will describe the EC GMO regulation and it will
underline its legislative changes in the last fifteen years. The second part will introduce
the current GMO dispute before the WTO and it will analyse the parties’ submissions
before the Panel. In the following part of the paper we will underline the main legal
issue at stake, which is the role of the precautionary principle in the EC GMO
regulation. We will see how the WTO has dealt with this principle in its previous case
law and we will study how the parties in the GMO dispute address this issue in their
submissions before the Panel . Finally, we will draw our conclusions on the possible
influence that the GMO dispute may have on the trade and environment debate.
2. THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  GENETICALLY  MODIFIED  ORGANISMS
REGULATION
                                                
5 See  Doc.  WT/DS291/23,  European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, 8 August
2003; Doc. WT/DS292/17, European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Canada, 8 August 2003; Doc.
WT/DS293/17, European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Argentina, 8 August 2003.
6  In accordance with Art. 9 of the DSU.
7  See Doc. WT/DS291/24, WT/DS292/18, WT/DS292/18, European Communities - Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products. Constitution of the Panel Established at the
Requests of the United States, Canada and Argentina. Note by the Secretariat, 5 March 2004. The
chairman of the Panel is Mr. Christian Häberli and the members are Mr. Mohan Kumar and Mr. Akio
Shimuzu.
8  Some commentators consider the request for further scientific advice as a victory for the EC. See
“Biotech case: scientists to be heard, final decision postponed”, 8.28 BRIDGES Weekly Trade News
Digest (2004).3
The EC has been dealing with the use and the placing on the market of GM
products since the mid 1980’s.
9 The GMO legislation has developed and it has been
modified in order to follow scientific novelties and public opinion concerns. Very
recently it has suffered a new important modification, which is important to underline
because the dispute before the WTO concerns only the old EC GMO regulation. The
Complainants specifically maintain that they are arguing against the application of the
old legislation and do not want the Panel to take into account recent developments in the
EC and its recent application.
10
Therefore, it is important to clarify which EC provisions are to be dealt with in
the GMO dispute. Council Directive 90/220/EEC on the deliberate release into the
environment of genetically modified organisms
11 is the first binding piece of legislation
regarding GMOs and it was approved in 1990. GMO regulation in the EC was
completed in 1997 by a Regulation on novel foods and novel food ingredients:
Regulation (EC) Nº 258/97,
12 while Directive 90/220/EEC was replaced in 2001 by
Directive 2001/18/EC.
13 These three pieces of legislation (Directive 90/220/EEC,
Directive 2001/18/EC and Regulation (EC) Nº 258/97) are the provisions that must be
dealt with before the WTO.
Furthermore, the EC GMO regulation has been modified very recently and the
previous legislation has been amended by two regulations: Regulation (EC) Nº
                                                
9  See Communication de la Commission au Conseil “Un Cadre Communautaire pour la
Reglamentation de la Biotechnologie”, COM(1986)0573.
10  This position is reaffirmed in European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products (WT/DS291), Executive Summary of the First Submission of the United
States -- 04/30/2004  (2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispu
te_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_file737_5542.pdf, § 16. Therefore, the fact that two GMOs have
been placed on the European market in the last months does not change the Complainants position.
11  Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment
of genetically modified organisms. Official Journal L 117 , 08/05/1990 P. 0015 – 0027. Hereinafter
Directive 90/220/EEC.
12  Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997
concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients. Official Journal L 043 , 14/02/1997 P. 0001 – 0006.
Hereinafter Reg. (EC) 258/97.
13  Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council
Directive 90/220/EEC - Commission Declaration Official Journal L 106 , 17/04/2001 P. 0001 – 0039.
Hereinafter Directive 2001/18/EC.4
1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed,
14 and by Regulation (EC) Nº
1830/2003 on labelling and traceability of genetically modified organisms.
15
2.1. Characteristics of the European Communities GMO Legislation
We will analyse the EC GMO legislation in order to underline its main
characteristics and we will specify which elements are due to the novel regulation. In
the first place, the objective of the legislation is to protect human health and the
environment from possible adverse effects arising from GMOs.
16 These objectives must
be fulfilled “in accordance with the precautionary principle”,
17 which is the cornerstone
of the EC legislation.
The scope of the regulation is the placing on the market of GM products. The
latter, in order to receive a market approval must not “present a danger for the
consumer”, must not “mislead the consumer” and must not “differ from the foods that
they are intended to replace to such an extent” for them to be “nutritionally
disadvantageous for the consumer”.
18 If the three criteria are met, the GM product will
be granted a market approval. According to Regulation (EC) Nº 258/97, this will be
determined by an initial assessment made by a Member State Food Assessment Body,
19
which follows a formal request from an applicant to place a GM product on the
market.
20 This request must provide information that demonstrates that the latter meets
                                                
14  Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2003  on genetically modified food and feed. Official Journal L 268 , 18/10/2003 P. 0001 – 0023.
Hereinafter Reg. (EC) 1829/2003.
15  Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September
2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms and the traceability of
food and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms and amending Directive
2001/18/EC. Official Journal L 268 , 18/10/2003 P. 0024 – 0028. Hereinafter Reg. (EC) 1830/2003.
16  See Reg. (EC) 258/97, §. 2, 5 of the preamble; Directive 2001/18/EC,  § 5, 43, 53, 56 of the
preamble and Art. 1. The new EC GMO regulation has the same objectives: see Reg. (EC) 1829/2003,
Art. 1.
17  Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 1: “In accordance with the precautionary principle, the objective of
this Directive is (…) to protect human health and the environment…”.
18  Reg. (EC) 258/97, Art. 3.1. The new EC GMO regulation sets the same criteria: see Reg. (EC)
1829/2003, Art. 4.1.
19  Reg. (EC) 258/97, Art. 6.2.
20  The authorisation procedure in Directive 2001/18/EC is provided for in Art. 13 through 15. The
new EC GMO legislation provides for a very similar procedure. In fact, according to Reg. (EC)
1829/2003, a GMO will be placed on the market only after an authorisation, which can be obtained from
the applicant from the competent authority of a Member State (Art. 5.1). The application must
demonstrate that the GMO meets the three criteria set out in Art. 4.1. In order to make a decision the
Competent Authority can ask a Member States Food Assessment Body for a food safety assessment and it
can ask a competent authority to carry out an environmental risk assessment (Art. 6.3).5
the three criteria above-mentioned.
21 It must also provide a dossier with the results of
the environmental risk assessment that the applicant is obliged to carry out.
Furthermore, the applicant must present a labelling proposal for the GM product once it
is placed on the market.
22 Further assessment regarding GM product market approval
may be requested to the applicant from the Competent Authority that is dealing with the
application or from any other Member State concerned with the placing on the market
of the GM product.
23 Directive 2001/18/EC provides for a very similar procedure.
However, it specifies that in case a market approval is requested for a specific kind of
GM product, it may have to meet new and more stringent criteria in order to better
protect human health and the environment.
24
If the Competent Authority decides in favour of a market approval, the applicant
can place the GM product on the market and his product shall circulate freely in all EC
Member States.
25 The decision that authorises the placing on the market of the GM
product will also establish the labelling requirements that the product must comply with.
It must have a label that specifies that the product is or contains a “genetically modified
organism”.
26 However, Directive 2001/18/EC maintains that labelling will not be
mandatory for those products that have only traces of authorised GMOs, under certain
thresholds.
27 The new GMO legislation has provided that labelling will not be necessary
for food containing less than 0,9% GMOs of the total ingredients.
28 The market
approval authorisation will be granted for a maximum of ten years.
29
Directive 2001/18/EC specifically maintained that the EC GMO legislation had
to be modified in order to be compatible with the new international community
consensus on trade in GMOs framed in the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol to the
                                                
21  Reg. (EC) 258/97, Art. 6.1.
22  Ibid, Art. 9.1.  See also Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 13.2.b. Labelling is one of the issues that the
new legislation has strengthened. It is, together with traceability, the main goal of Reg. (EC) 1830/2003.
See the objective laid down in Art. 1: “This Regulation provides a framework for the traceability of
products consisting of or containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and food and feed
produced from GMOs, with the objectives of facilitating accurate labelling, monitoring the effects on the
environment and, where appropriate, on health, and the implementation of the appropriate risk
management measures including, if necessary, withdrawal of products”, and Art. 4.6.
23  See Reg. (EC) 258/97, Art. 6.3 and Art. 7. The request for further information in order to grant a
market approval is also provided for in Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 15.
24  Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 16.
25  Ibid, Art. 22.
26  Reg. (EC) 258/97, Art. 8.1.d. and Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 21.
27  Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 21.2.
28  Reg. (EC) 1829/2003, Art. 12.2.
29  Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 15.4. The same is provided in Reg. (EC) 1829/2003, Art. 7.5.6
Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter ‘Cartagena Protocol’),
30 which entered
into effect on September 11, 2003.
31 The two new Regulations that currently amend the
previous EC GMO legislation are the result of the compromise of the EC with the
Cartagena Protocol. The new legislation is very similar to the previous one. However,
environmental and safety requirements seem to have been strengthened as well as
labelling requirements. What is definitely new is the section regarding traceability,
which has been pushed through from public opinion concerns. A correct application of
Reg. (EC) 1830/2003 will allow consumers to know at all subsequent stages of the
placing on the market if a product is or contains a GMO.
32
In conclusion, the EC GMO regulation refers to the placing on the market of GM
products. The entire legislation is based on the precautionary principle and on an
authorisation procedure, which follows an environmental and health risk assessment.
Once a GM product is placed on the market its must be labelled and it must be traceable
at all times.
3. THE GMO DISPUTE BEFORE THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Once clarified the EC GMO legislation, this part of the paper will analyse the
dispute between the EC and the Complainants before the WTO. The dispute is still
before the panel and a decision is expected in March 2005. This part of the paper will be
based mainly, but not only, on the first submission of the parties to the Panel
33 and on
the Amicus Curiae that has been sent to the Panel by a coalition of fifteen NGOs.
34
This part of the paper is divided into four sections. Firstly, we will clarify which
measures have been challenged by the Claimants before the Panel. Secondly, we will
                                                
30  Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 32, Dir. 2001.
31  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal, January
29, 2000, in force September 11, 2003, 39 ILM (2000), at 1027.
32  Reg. (EC) 1830/2003, Art. 4.1 through 4.4.
33  European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products
(WT/DS291), First written submission by the European Communities - 17/05/2004 – (2004), available at
http://www.genewatch.org/WTO/Submissions/EC_WTO_Submission.pdf, (Hereinafter  First written
submission by the European Communities); European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products (WT/DS291), First Submission of the United States -- 04/21/2004
(2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispu
te_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_file720_5542.pdf, (Hereinafter First written submission of  the
United States)
34  European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products
(WT/DS291), Information submitted to the Panel by Non-Parties (Amicus Curiae Submission) together
referred to as the Amicus Coalition, 27/05/2004, (Hereinafter  Amicus Curiae Submission).7
analyse the preliminary issues that have been raised by the parties. Thirdly, we will deal
with the supposed violations of the SPS Agreement. Finally, we will underline possible
breaches of other WTO Agreements.
3.1. Challenged Measures before the Panel
In the request for the establishment of the Panel the Claimants identify three EC
measures that negatively affected their exports of GM products to the European market.
The first measure is the so called general moratoria, which has been defined as “the
suspension by the EC of consideration of applications for, or granting of, approval of
biotech products”.
35 The second measure is the product specific moratoria, which is the
“the failure by the EC to consider or approve, without undue delay, applications for
approval of [specific] products”.
36 The last EC measures that have been challenged by
the Complainants are the national restrictions on imports of GM products, which have
been defined as “bans on agricultural biotechnology products introduced by EC member
States which infringe both WTO rules and Community legislation”.
37
In sum, it is important to underline that the scope of the Panel’s decision is
limited to these three measures. All parties agree on this. In fact, the Complainants
clarify that they do not want the panel to make findings on the consistency of the EC
GMO legislation
38 with WTO law and the EC reaffirms that its legislation per se is not
within the Panel’s jurisdiction.
39
3.2. Preliminary Issues
Before analysing the single provisions that have been violated by the EC
measures according to the Complainants position, it is necessary to underline two
preliminary issues, which are relevant to the dispute. In particular, we will deal with the
nature of the challenged measures and with the applicable law to such measures.
                                                
35 See  Doc.  WT/DS291/23, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States… op. cit.
36 See  Doc.  WT/DS292/17,  Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Canada… op. cit.
37 See  Doc.  WT/DS293/17,  Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Argentina… op. cit.
38  First written submission of the United States § 68.
39  First written submission by the European Communities § 382 and 517.8
3.2.1. Nature of the challenged measures
The parties disagree on this point and it can be argued that the dispute’s final
decision will depend on how the Panel decides this very first preliminary issue.
On the one hand, the Complainants consider that, despite the fact that the EC
general moratoria and the product specific moratoria are not present in any official
document, they have the same effects as if they were embodied in legal documents.
40
On the other hand, the EC clearly argues that all assertions about a deliberate
moratoria are to be intended as ‘delays’ in the authorisation procedure for the placing on
the market of GM products.
41 The EC strongly maintains that there is no general or
product specific moratoria. It defends its position by saying, on the one hand, that the
fact that no approval has been granted does not prove that the process has been
suspended and,
42 on the other hand, that under the simplified procedure provided for in
Reg. (EC) 258/97 thirteen GM products have been placed on the market since 1998.
43
Furthermore, the EC argues that the Complainants position is based only on political
statements, which, according to their interpretation, announce the GMO moratoria. On
the one hand, the EC replies that these statements do not have any value as evidence of
practice
44 and, on the other hand, that the political statements, such as the Common
Position previous to the enter into force of Directive 2001/18/EC, must be read in full.
45
The EC finishes its argumentation saying that, even if a pattern may be found against
the interests of the Complainants, a pattern is not a challengeable measure before the
WTO.
46
In other words, the Complainants consider that the EC from 1998 to 2003 has
deliberately denied any GMO market approval application. Therefore, the EC has
established a general and a product specific moratoria, which is a challengeable measure
before the WTO. On the opposite, the EC maintains that there has not been any general
moratoria and that what the Complainants call product specific moratoria must be dealt
                                                
40  First written submission of the United States § 81: “In short, the EC measure blocks biotech
approvals just as effectively as would a written amendment to the EC legislation.”
41 See,  First written submission by the European Communities… § 373.
42  Ibid § 548.
43  Ibid § 549.
44  Ibid § 560.
45  Ibid § 563-564.
46  Ibid § 566.9
with as issues of ‘delays’ in the authorisation procedure for the placing on the market of
GM products.
47
The EC position leads to two first conclusions. Firstly, no charge can be
presented against its general moratoria because such moratoria does not exist. Secondly,
the charges against its allegedly product specific moratoria must focus on ‘delay’ issues.
On the opposite, the EC does not contest the challengeable nature of the national GMO
bans from several Member States.
3.2.2 Applicable Law
The parties disagree in their interpretation on which WTO Agreements is
applicable to the EC measures. On the one hand, among the Complainants, the US
strongly maintains that the objective of the EC measures is the protection of human
health and that, therefore, the applicable law must be found in the Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (hereinafter ‘SPS Agreement’).
48 On the other
hand, both Argentina and Canada presented also claims under the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter ‘TBT Agreement’) and under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter ‘GATT’) in alternative to the SPS
Agreement.
The EC argues that in order to determine the applicable law the objective of its
GMO legislation and of the different WTO Agreements must be analysed together. It
maintains that the main objective of its GMO related legislation is to protect the
environment.
49 While the SPS does not deal with environmental concerns, the TBT and
the GATT do have environmental related provisions. Therefore, the EC concludes that
the SPS Agreement is applicable only to the extent that the challenged measures are
relative to the protection of human health, while, when the main interest is
environmental protection, the applicable law must be found in the other two WTO
Agreements.
50
Furthermore, the EC stresses the importance of the Cartagena Protocol in this
dispute. It argues that the WTO must not be read in clinical isolation from International
                                                
47  This is important to underline because it refers to the application of a provision and not to its
establishment.
48  First written submission of the United States § 71-80. However, it reserved the right to make
claims also under the TBT Agreement.
49  First written submission by the European Communities…§ 416.  10
Law.
51 On the contrary, the multilateral trading system must take into account
international law rules ad principles. The Cartagena Protocol is currently the most
advanced and ‘specific’ international legal text in the field of trade in GMOs. The EC,
together with leading experts,
52 considers that the Cartagena Protocol can assess the
WTO in the interpretation of specific issues, such as the application of the precautionary
principle or of the environmental risk assessment.
53 In other words, it maintains that,
because the Cartagena Protocol has a more ‘specific’ scope than the WTO, provisions
present in WTO agreements may be clarified through reference to provisions therein.
54
Among the Complainants the US has the strongest position against the
possibility for the Panel to use the Cartagena Protocol to interpret WTO provisions. It
clearly says that the Protocol is not applicable because the Complainants are not parties
in it and that, even if they were, the Protocol does not affect rights arising from other
international treaties.
55
3.3. Violation of the SPS Agreement
The Complainants consider that the EC general moratoria, the product specific
moratoria and the national bans breach several SPS provisions. These violations can be
divided into two groups: violations of procedural requirements (Art. 8 and Annex B,
Art. 7 and Annex C) and violations of substantive obligations (Art. 5.1 and Art. 2.2).
These violations entail a disguised restriction on international trade in accordance with
Art. 5.5 and Art. 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.
                                                                                                                                              
50  Ibid § 449.
51  WTO law as part of Public International Law has been underlined in previous WTO case law;
see Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R Appellate Body Report: United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline , 1996, p. 621.
52  T. Cottier, “Implications for trade law and policy: towards convergence and integration”, in C.
Bail, R. Falkner & H. Marquard, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in
Biotechnology with Environment and Development?: London; Royal Institute for International Affairs
(2002), p. 478: “In particular, it is conceivable to construe the provisions and risk assessment in light of
the more advanced and better rules on risk assessment and risk management of the protocol.”
53  The importance of the Cartagne Biosafety Protocol is underlined in First written submission by
the European Communities…§ 453-459.
54 See  infra, pp. 31-33.
55  European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products
(WT/DS291),  Executive Summary of the U.S. Rebuttal Position -- 07/29/2004  (2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispu
te_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_file908_5542.pdf, § 17-18.11
3.3.1. Violation of Procedural Requirements
According to the Complainants position, the EC measures constitute a violation
of specific procedural requirements provided for in the SPS Agreement. On the one
hand, the measures do not comply with the obligation to undertake approval procedures
without undue delay (Art. 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement) and, on the other
hand, they do not comply with the obligation to promptly publish sanitary measures
(Art. 7 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement).
3.3.1.1. Approval procedures must be undertaken without undue delay
The first procedural requirement that presumably has been violated is provided
for in Art. 8 of the SPS Agreement,
56 which must be read together with Annex C,
paragraph 1 (a).
57 The two provisions maintain that parties are allowed to establish
marketing approval systems based on an authorisation process, such as the EC
procedure for the placing on the market of GM products. However, the SPS Agreement
requires such procedures to be “undertaken and completed without undue delay”.
58
Undue delay is considered by the Complainants to be “the “unjustifiable” and
excessive” [ ] “hindrance” in undertaking or completing an approval procedure”.
59 The
EC moratoria falls into this definition and, therefore, the EC measures violate SPS
obligations provided for in Art. 8 and Annex C.
                                                
56  SPS Agreement, Art. 8: “Members shall observe the provisions of Annex C in the operation of
control, inspection and approval procedures, including national systems for approving the use of additives
or for establishing tolerances for contaminants in foods, beverages or feedstuffs, and otherwise ensure
that their procedures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”
57  Ibid, Annex C.1 (a): “Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure
the fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that such procedures are undertaken and completed
without undue delay and in no less favourable manner for imported products than for like domestic
products.” (Emphasis added).
58 Emphasis  added.
59  First written submission of the United States § 89. For the reasoning behind the product specific
moratoria see ibidem § 137-139.12
The EC, as we have mentioned above, maintains in the first place that the
general moratoria does not exist and that, therefore, it cannot be challenged under any
WTO provision. In the second place, it argues that the product specific moratoria is not
a deliberated ban on GMO imports. It is only an issue of ‘undue delay’. Therefore, it
agrees with the Claimants that this EC measure can be challenged under such
procedural requirement. However, it denies that the authorisation procedures violates
Annex C.1 (a) of the SPS Agreement. The delay in the authorisation process would be
caused by the request for further information, which is an essential element of the GMO
legislation.
60
3.3.1.2. Sanitary Measures must be published promptly
The second procedural requirement that has been violated according to the
Complainants position is provided for in Art. 7 of the SPS Agreement,
61 which must be
read together with Annex B, paragraph 1.
62 The two provisions maintain that sanitary
measures must be published promptly.
The Complainants argue, as we have seen above, that the EC moratoria is a
measure, notwithstanding the fact that it is not present in any official document.
63
Consequently, the measure should have been published in order to enable other WTO
                                                
60  First written submission by the European Communities…§ 487.
61  SPS Agreement, Art. 7: “Members shall notify changes in their sanitary or phytosanitary
measures and shall provide information on their sanitary or phytosanitary measures in accordance with
the provisions of Annex B.”
62  Ibid,  Annex C.1 (b): “Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure
the fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that (…) the standard processing period of each
procedure is published or that the anticipated processing period is communicated to the applicant upon
request;  when receiving an application, the competent body promptly examines the completeness of the
documentation and informs the applicant in a precise and complete manner of all deficiencies;  the
competent body transmits as soon as possible the results of the procedure in a precise and complete
manner to the applicant so that corrective action may be taken if necessary;  even when the application
has deficiencies, the competent body proceeds as far as practicable with the procedure if the applicant so
requests;  and that upon request, the applicant is informed of the stage of the procedure, with any delay
being explained;” Emphasis added.
63 See  supra pp. 8-9.13
members to become acquainted with it. Not having fulfilled this requirement, the EC
has violated Art. 7 of the SPS Agreement.
64
The EC defence is once again based on the fact that the general moratoria does
not exist as such and that the authorisation procedure has followed correctly the EC
legislation and has not violated Annex C.1(b) of the SPS Agreement.
65
3.3.2. Violation of substantive obligations
The Complainants argue that the EC measures do not comply with substantive
obligations present in the SPS Agreement. They consider that they do not comply with
the obligation to carry out a risk assessment (Art. 5.1) and with the obligation to base
measures on scientific principles (Art. 2.2.).
3.3.2.1. Sanitary measures must be based on a risk assessment
The first substantive obligation that has been presumably violated by the EC
measures is provided for in Art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement that obliges sanitary
measures to be based on a risk assessment.
66
According to the Complainants position the EC has established the moratoria
without a previous risk assessment. While the Appellate Body has argued in earlier
decisions that in order for a sanitary measure to be established there must be a “rational
relationship between the measure  and the risk assessment”,
67 in this case there would
be no relationship whatsoever because no risk assessment has been undertaken.
Therefore, it is clear, according to the Complainants position, that the EC moratoria
violates Art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.
68
                                                
64  First written submission of the United States § 92-95. For the reasoning behind the product
specific moratoria see ibidem § 140-142.
65  First written submission by the European Communities…§ 505. Furthermore, the EC stresses
that the Complainants have not made a prima facie case.
66  SPS Agreement, Art. 5.1: “Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures
are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant
life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations.” Emphasis added.
67  Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R: Appellate Body Report: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), 1998, § 193.
68  First written submission of the United States § 100-108. For the reasoning behind the product
specific moratoria see ibidem § 143-149.14
The EC defence is based, firstly, on the fact that the general moratoria does not
exist as such. Secondly, the EC argues that its GMO legislation includes risk
assessments as one of the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to grant a market
approval and that this has been done in all challenged GMO applications.
69 Finally, the
EC considers that the national bans and the product specific moratoria are not to be
dealt with under the SPS Agreement. However, if they were to be challenged therein
they are justified under Art. 5.7.
70 In fact, they constitute a temporary provision based
on the precautionary principle. Furthermore, the EC argues that they were established
because science was not sufficient; that they were based on the available pertinent
information; that the Member States are seeking for more information; and that the
measures will be reviewed.
71
3.3.2.2. Sanitary measures must be based on scientific principles
The second substantive obligation that has been supposedly violated by the EC
measures is provided for in Art. 2.2. of the SPS Agreement,
72 according to which
sanitary measures must be based on scientific principles.
According to previous WTO jurisprudence, if a measure is not based on a risk
assessment, it will also not be based on scientific principles. Following this reasoning
the Complainants consider that the EC measures are not based on scientific principles
and that, therefore, they also violate Art. 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.
73
The EC replies maintaining that its measures do not violate Art. 2.2 because they
are justified under Art. 5.7 of the SPS Agreement and because, nevertheless, they were
based on an environmental risk assessment.
74
                                                
69  Ibid § 604.
70  First written submission by the European Communities…§ 575 and 593.
71  Therefore the EC provisions complies with the requirements provided for in SPS Agreement,
Art. 5.7: “In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt
sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the
relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other
Members.  In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for
a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a
reasonable period of time.” Emphasis added.
72  SPS Agreement, Art. 2.2.: “Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is
applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific
principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in
paragraph 7 of Article 5.” Emphasis added.
73  First written submission of the United States § 109-111. For the reasoning behind the product
specific moratoria see ibidem § 150.
74  First written submission by the European Communities…§ 615.15
3.3.3. Disguised Restriction on International Trade
The Complainants argue that the EC measures are a disguised restriction on
international trade because, on the one hand, they violated Art. 5.5 that obliges members
to be consistent in the application of sanitary measures, and, on the other hand, because
the EC measures also violated Art. 2.3 that obliges members to not discriminate in the
application of sanitary measures.
3.3.3.1. The application of sanitary measures must be consistent
EC measures violate Art. 5.5 of the SPS Agreement according to the
Complainants position. This provision maintains that no member shall be inconsistent in
the application of sanitary measures to such an extent that those measures would result
in discrimination or in a disguised restriction of international trade.
The Complainants argue that in order to determine whether a measure violates
Art. 5.5 three conditions must be met.
75 First, different sanitary measures must be
established for similar situations. The EC was doing exactly so by distinguishing
between products elaborated with GMOs, such as certain types of cheeses, whose
placing on the market does not have to be authorised, and new GM products that must
be previously authorised. Second, these differences must not be arbitrary or
unjustifiable. The Complainants consider that both kinds of GM products could suppose
health or environmental problems and that there is no solid reason for their
discrimination. Third, the measures will be a disguised restriction of international trade
if the two first conditions are met and if they were not based on a risk assessment. As
we have already seen above, the Complainants maintain that the measures were not
based on a risk assessment. Therefore, the three conditions are met and the EC measures
violate Art. 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.
76 This conclusion is supported by an ‘additional
                                                
75  SPS Agreement, Art. 5.5.: “With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the
concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection against risks to human life or health,
or to animal and plant life or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the
levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade.” (Emphasis added).
76  First written submission of the United States § 112-127. For the reasoning behind the product
specific moratoria see ibidem § 151-152.16
factor’, which is the extremely more important effect of the GMO moratoria on the US,
Canada and Argentina producers than on the Europeans…
77
The EC replies only to the challenge to its national bans and to the products
specific moratoria. It considers that they do not violate Art. 5.5 because they fall under
the exception provided for in Art. 5.7. However, the argues that GM products are
different from non GM products and that to establish a regulatory difference between
the two products is neither arbitrary nor unjustified.
78
3.3.3.2. Sanitary measures must not be discriminatory
The last SPS Agreement provision that has been violated by the EC measures,
according to the Complainants position, is Art. 2.3.,
79 according to which sanitary
measures must not discriminate between members where similar conditions prevail.
Previous WTO jurisprudence has maintained that if a measure violates Art. 5.5,
the measure will also be deemed discriminatory and, therefore, in violation of Art. 2.3.
80
Following this reasoning the Complainants consider that the EC measures also violate
this last SPS provision.
81
                                                
77  Ibid § 126: “Finally, the “additional factor” is a disproportionate effect of the general
moratorium on producers outside the European Communities as compared to producers within the
European Communities. In 2001, the European Communities accounted for less than four-tenths of one
percent of the worldwide land area devoted to growing biotech products. In contrast, the United States,
Argentina, Canada, and China accounted for ninety-nine percent of the total land area devoted to biotech
products in 2001. For producers in these countries, the moratorium on approvals of biotech products has
had a substantial negative effect. The disproportionate impact of the general moratorium on internal
versus imported products is an “additional factor” as it is a strong indication that the measure is
discriminatory or a disguised restriction on international trade.”
78  First written submission by the European Communities…§ 621.
79  SPS Agreement, Art. 2.3.: “Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures
do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions
prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members.  Sanitary and phytosanitary
measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international
trade.” (Emphasis added).
80  Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R: Appellate Body Report: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), 1998, § 212.
81  First written submission of the United States § 128-129.17
The EC argues in the same way but with opposite conclusions. Taking into
account that the national bans and the product specific moratoria do not violate Art.
5.5., they will also not violate Art. 2.3.
3.4. Violation of Other WTO Agreements
While the US only presented claims of SPS violations in its first submission to
the Panel, Canada and Argentina also raised issues related to other WTO Agreements.
Both countries consider that the EC challenged measures are inconsistent with the TBT
Agreement and with the GATT. Furthermore, Argentina considers that the moratoria is
violating EC WTO obligations to developing countries arising from the special and
differential treatment clause, which is present in the SPS and in the TBT Agreement.
Finally, the EC argues that, even if the Panel should decide in favour of the Claimants’
position, all measures would be justified under Art. XX of the GATT.
3.4.1. Violation of the TBT Agreement
Canada and Argentina claim that the EC measures have also breached the TBT
Agreement. Even in this case the EC raises a preliminary issue that will be fundamental
for the dispute. The TBT Agreement only applies to technical regulations and the EC
does not consider the challenged measures to be so. According to the European position,
these measures do not lay down clear requirements and cannot be considered abstract
technical regulations.
82 Therefore, the EC does not reply to the alleged violations of the
TBT Agreement.
However, it is interesting to see which provisions were violated, according to the
position of Canada and Argentina. Firstly, the two countries consider that the EC
measures violate Art. 2.1 of the TBT Agreement that obliges parties, in relation to
technical regulations, to not discriminate imported like products.
83 Secondly, the
challenged measures violated Art. 2.2.,
84 according to which members are allowed to
                                                
82  First written submission by the European Communities…§ 649-650.
83  TBT Agreement, Art. 2.1.: “Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations,
products imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than
that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.”
84  Ibid, Art. 2.2.: “Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or
applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  For this
purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate18
establish technical regulations for the protection of human health or the environment but
these must not create “unnecessary obstacles to international trade”. Canada and
Argentina maintain that the EC measures objective is neither human health nor
environmental protection and that their application is unnecessarily trade restrictive.
85
3.4.2. Violation of the GATT
While the US has not presented any claim under the GATT, Canada and
Argentina include also this WTO Agreement in their submissions to the Panel. Both
countries consider that the product specific moratoria and the national bans violate Art.
III. 4 of the GATT.
86 This provision is one of the cornerstones of the multilateral trading
system and it lays down the national treatment principle according to which a country
can not give to an imported product a different treatment than the one accorded to a
domestic like product.
Canada, Argentina and the EC agree on the three conditions that must be met in
order for there to be a violation of Art. III. 4 of the GATT. First, imported and domestic
products must be ‘like products’; second, the challenged measure must be a law; and
third, imported products must be accorded a less favourable treatment than like
domestic products.
87
The first condition is to determine a GM like product.
88 Argentina and Canada
consider that GM like products are the domestically grown non biotech counterparts.
89
On the other hand, the EC argues that the only possible like product is a domestic GM
product.
90 The second condition is to assess whether the challenged measures is a law or
a regulation. Despite the fact that the moratorias are not present in any official
                                                                                                                                              
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.  Such legitimate objectives are, inter
alia:  national security requirements;  the prevention of deceptive practices;  protection of human health
or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.  In assessing such risks, relevant elements of
consideration are, inter alia:  available scientific and technical information, related processing technology
or intended end-uses of products.”
85 See  First written submission of Canada, § 486-499, and First written submission of Argentina, §
571-583, cited in First written submission by the European Communities…note 409 and 411.
86  GATT, Art. III.4.: “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. (…)” Emphasis added.
87  First written submission by the European Communities…§ 520.
88  On the like product issue in the dispute see also the Amicus Curiae Submission, § 117-121.
89 See  First written submission of Canada, heading VII.B.1(b),  and First written submission of
Argentina, heading III.a. cited in First written submission by the European Communities…note 389 and
390.19
document, Argentina and Canada consider that they should be considered as if they
were laws. On the other hand, the EC maintains that only the national bans are laws in
accordance with the Art. III.4 GATT requirement, while the alleged moratorias must be
considered as issues related to possible delays in the application of a legitimate
procedure.
91 The third condition that must be met is to see whether imported and
domestic like products are treated unequally. The Complainants argue that the
domestically grown non biotech counterparts do not have to be authorised in order to be
placed on the market and, therefore, they consider that the EC measures finally violate
Art. III. 4 of the GATT. On the other hand, the EC reaches the opposite conclusion
because it says that the domestic GMO are placed on the European market in
accordance with the same authorisation process that regulates imported GMOs.
92
3.4.3. Violation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions
Argentina claims that the EC moratoria has negatively affected exports to the EC
from developing countries that have adopted GMOs techniques in their agriculture. This
violates, according to Argentina’s position, Art. 10.1 of the SPS Agreement and Art.
12.3 of the TBT Agreement that embody the principle of the special and differential
treatment principle.
The US does not specify which WTO provisions have been violated by the EC
measures in relation to developing country exports, but it does underline strongly their
negative impact. It considers that countries whose population is starving have denied
US aid consisting in GM food for fear that their meat exports to the EC would have
been hindered.
93 The US in its submission suggests that “agronomic and nutritional
issues of particular concern to developing countries” can be solved through “biotech
research activities”.
94 Thereby, the US seems to be blaming the EC of hindering global
solutions to food shortage.
95
                                                                                                                                              
90  First written submission by the European Communities…§ 536 and 634.
91  Ibid § 522-526 and 627.
92  Ibid § 527-532 and 629.
93  First written submission of the United States § 64-66. The EC strongly critices this position.
Furthermore, the new legislation is very clear on this point; see Reg. (EC) 1829/2003, § 16 of the
preamble: “
94  Ibid § 64.
95 However,  the  Amicus Curiae Submission, § 15 remind us that the US “is unique among
industrialised countries in refusing to donate financial aid as food aid and insisting on the provision of US
grain generated as agricultural surpluses. Aid is therefore used in an effort to support US corporations and
interests…”20
The EC maintains that Argentina’s allegations only ground is that the moratoria
is illegal and that, therefore, it also violates Art. 10.1 of the SPS Agreement. It also
contests Argentina’s position in relation to Art. 12.3 of the same Agreement, according
to which the EC measures would violate this provision because they also violate Art.
5.2.1 of the TBT. Furthermore, the EC replies to Argentina’s claim also on factual
grounds maintaining that statistics demonstrate that developing country exports have
not reduced since they have been using GMOs.
96
3.4.4. Art. XX, GATT
The last legal issue in the dispute has been brought up by the EC. The latter
strongly disagrees with the Claimants and considers that its measures do not breach the
different WTO Agreements. However, it maintains that, if the Panel should decide
otherwise, the challenged measures (the general moratoria, the product specific
moratoria and the national bans) are justified under Art. XX of the GATT. In fact, the
EC argues that the measures fall under either letter (b),
97 (d)
98 or (g)
99 of this provision
and that they do not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination that results in
a disguised restriction on international trade.
100
3.5. Concluding Remarks on the GMO Dispute before the WTO
In conclusion, the Complainants consider that the three challenged EC measures,
the general moratoria, the product specific moratoria and the national bans, violate
provisions of the SPS Agreement, of the TBT Agreement and of the GATT.
Furthermore, Argentina argues that the special and differential treatment principle has
                                                
96  First written submission by the European Communities…§ 671. According to the Amicus Curiae
Submission, § 15: “Roundup Ready soybeans grown in Argentina can be imported in the EC, but are
restricted by lack of market demand,…”
97  GATT, Art. XX (b): “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (…) necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”
98  GATT, Art. XX (d): “(…)necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the
enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of
patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices.”
99  GATT, Art. XX (g): “(…) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”21
also been violated by the EC measures. On the other hand, the EC denies that the
general moratoria exists as such and it considers that both the general and the product
specific moratoria must be dealt with by the Panel as possible cases of undue delay in
the application of the authorisation procedure for the placing on the market of GMOs.
Therefore, the EC focuses on the national bans and on the pending applications (the
product specific moratoria). It maintains that both do not breach any WTO Agreement.
Firstly, they are provisional measures based on the precautionary principle, thereby
justified under Art. 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. Secondly, they cannot be challenged
under the TBT Agreement because they are not technical regulations. Thirdly, they do
not violate Art. III. 4 of the GATT because they do not treat differently domestic like
products. The EC concludes saying that even if the Panel should find the EC measures
to violate any of the WTO Agreements, these measures are justified under Art. XX of
the GATT.
4. THE ROLE OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE GMO DISPUTE
This part of the paper pursues two goals: first, it wants to show the importance
of the precautionary principle in the GMO dispute before the WTO. Second, it wants to
analyse how it has been dealt with in previous WTO disputes and how it has been
conceived by the parties in the current dispute.
This part is divided into four sections. The first one will deal with the
precautionary principle within the EC GMO legislation. The second section will
underline its presence in a global context. The third one will analyse how the
precautionary principle has been dealt with in previous WTO case law and the last
section will finally study its role in the GMO dispute, according to the position of the
parties therein.
4.1. The Precautionary Principle in the EC GMO Policy
                                                                                                                                              
100  First written submission by the European Communities…§ 673-674.22
The analysis of Directive 2001/18/EC demonstrates that the precautionary
principle is the founding pillar of the EC GMO legislation.
101 It first appears in the
preamble, which not only lays down the principles that govern the piece of legislation; it
also should be used in order to interpret any provision of the Directive. Paragraph 8 of
the preamble reads as follows:
“The precautionary principle has been taken into account in the drafting of this Directive
and must be taken into account when implementing it.”
102
The Directive clearly maintains that the precautionary principle guided the
drafters of the EC GMO legislation. Furthermore, the preamble underlines that the
principle is not only a theoretical reference. On the contrary, it must be taken into
account at all phases of the Directive’s implementation.
103 In other words, the
application of Directive 2001/18/EC must be based on the precautionary principle.
The latter is also present in the normative part of the Directive. Human health
and environmental protection are the EC GMO legislation objectives and they must be
pursued in accordance with the precautionary principle, according to Art. 1 of Directive
2001/18/EC.
104 This provision must be analysed together with Art. 4 that lays down the
general obligations upon the parties and reads:
“Member States shall, in accordance with the precautionary principle, ensure that all
appropriate measures are taken in order to avoid adverse effects on human health and the
environment which might arise from the deliberate release or the placing on the market of
GMOs. GMOs may only be deliberately released or placed on the market in conformity
with part B or part C respectively.”
105
As we have already analysed in Part 2 of this paper, the placing on the market of
a GM product is based on an authorisation procedure provided for in part C of Directive
2001/18/EC. One of the elements of this procedure is the environmental risk assessment
that shall help to assess the final competent authority’s decision to grant or to deny
market access to the GMO. The principles that govern the environmental risk
                                                
101  A study of the precautionary principle in Directive 2001/18/EC is present in L. Boy, “La place
du principe de précaution dans la directive UE du mars 2001 relative a la dissémination volontaire
d'organismes génétiquement modifiés dans l'environnement”, Revue Juridique de l'Environnement (2002-
1), pp. 5-24.
102 Emphasis  added.
103  See L. Boy… op. cit., pp. 9-11.
104  Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 1:“In accordance with the precautionary principle, the objective of
this Directive is (…) to protect human health and the environment…”.
105  Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 4.1.23
assessment are provided for in Annex II to the Directive 2001/18/EC and must be taken
into account “in accordance with the precautionary principle”.
106
The analysis of Art. 1, Art. 4.1 and of the principles governing the
environmental risk assessment demonstrate that the human health and environmental
protection goal must be fulfilled not only by taking into account the precautionary
principle; but through the precautionary principle. Laurence Boy has been clear on this
issue arguing that Directive 2001/18/EC identifies the content of the precautionary
principle.
107 The latter must be used in the implementation of the community legislation
on GMOs.  In other words, once again, the application of Directive 2001/18/EC must be
based on the precautionary principle.
4.1.1 The Relevance of the GMO Dispute Scope
This conclusion is very important for the GMO dispute before the WTO. We
have seen that all parties therein agree that the Panel must not decide on the consistency
of the EC GMO legislation with WTO law. On the one hand, the Complainants consider
that the dispute’s scope is the EC denial of all GM product market access applications
from 1998 to 2003 that, according to their position, accounts to a WTO challengeable
measure. On the other hand, the EC considers that the scope indicated by the
Complainants is not a measure. The denial of a market access is the ultimate phase of a
procedure. It amounts to the implementation of a measure.
In other words, if the EC position on the scope of the dispute prevails, the Panel
is called to decide on the application of the EC GMO legislation. But, as we have
mentioned above, the application of Directive 2001/18/EC must be based on the
precautionary principle. The Panel’s scope in the GMO dispute would then be to assess
the consistency of the application of a measure based on the precautionary principle
with WTO law.
108
4.2 The Precautionary Principle in a Global Context
                                                
106  Directive 2001/18/EC, Annex II (B)
107 See  L.  Boy…  op. cit., p. 9: “La nouvelle directive fait explicitement reference au principe de
precaution et donne un contenu concret à ce dernier.”24
Having underlined the importance of the precautionary principle in the GMO
dispute before the WTO, this section will analyse how this principle has evolved in the
international community.
4.2.1. The Precautionary Principle as an International Environmental Law Principle
Even if the origins of the precautionary principle were related to human health
issues,
109 currently it has become a principle of International Environmental Law. The
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992 was the first international
instrument to include the precautionary principle.
110 From then on, it has been present in
many multilateral environmental agreements such as the Convention on Biological
Diversity
111 or the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
112
International trade in GMOs has been on the international community’s agenda
since the beginning of the nineties of the last century. Finally, in 2003 a multilateral
treaty dealing with trade in GMOs entered into force: the Cartagena Protocol. An
analysis of this treaty shows that the EC shares with the international community the
fact that the precautionary principle is one of the pillars of the GMO trade regulation. In
fact, the Cartagena Protocol main provisions are based on it and, similarly to the EC
provisions, the principle must also be applied in the implementation of the Protocol. The
human health and environmental objectives of the Protocol must be fulfilled taking into
                                                                                                                                              
108  Even if the Panel should decide that its scope is to determine the consistency of the challenged
EC measures with the WTO, the precautionary principle will still be a central element of the dispute
because the alleged measures are directly linked to it.
109  See The editors, “Working towards a strong protocol”, 43 Biotechnology and Development
Monitor (2000), pp. 2-3.
110  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (UN Doc. A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1), printed
in 31 ILM (1992), at 874. Principle 15 reads as follows: “In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
111  Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31
ILM (1992), at 818., Preamble: “Noting also that where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of
biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
measures to avoid or minimize such a threat,” Emphasis present in the original text.
112  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21
March 1994, 31 ILM (1992), at 849, Art. 3.3.: “The Parties should take precautionary measures to
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason
for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change
should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”25
account the precautionary principle
113 and trade in GMOs can be denied in accordance
with it.
114
In conclusion, the precautionary principle is now present in many multilateral
environmental agreements and it is a pillar of the international community’s most
advanced legal framework on biotechnology.
4.2.2 Precautionary Principle as a Sustainable Development Law Principle?
In the last few years some of the international environmental principles have
evolved. Some are not only related to the protection of the environment but they have
also other characteristics and pursue similar but different objectives. This evolution
must be analysed together with the effort to better define sustainable development.
Leading scholars participating in the International Law Association (hereinafter ILA)
have drafted a declaration that lists and defines the principles related to sustainable
development: the New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to
Sustainable Development.
115 This document, embodied in a United Nations General
Assembly Resolution, includes the precautionary principle.
116
Notwithstanding the important result of the ILA, there are still many sceptics
about the legal nature of sustainable development and of its principles. According to the
author of this paper: “Currently it [sustainable development] reflects a policy goal of the
international community. However, (…) some of the principles which form sustainable
development, such as the precautionary principle and the common but differentiated
responsibilities principle, are progressively developing into International Law
norms.”
117
                                                
113  Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity…  op. cit., Art. 1: “In
accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle  15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate
level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms
resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on
transboundary movements.”
114  Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity… op. cit., Art. 10.6 and 11.8.
115  UN Doc. A/57/329 New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to
Sustainable Development, 31 of August, 2002.
116  See UN Doc. A/57/329 New Delhi… op. cit., Art. 4; in particular Art. 4.3.: “Decision-making
processes should always endorse a precautionary approach to risk management and in particular should
include the adoption of appropriate precautionary measures.”
117  The quotation is part of an oral presentation that the author gave at the European Society of
International Law Inaugural Conference in Florence, 13-15 May, 2005. The author participated in the26
The importance to determine whether the precautionary principle is a norm of
international law is without doubt. A conclusion in one or in the other direction has
relevant practical consequences for the relationship with the WTO and it is extremely
important for the GMO dispute.
4.3. The Precautionary Principle in the WTO Jurisprudence
In this section we will analyse how the WTO has dealt with the precautionary
principle and we will underline its position on the legal nature of the principle.
The multilateral trading system takes into account sustainable development
interests. In fact, the preamble of the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (hereinafter ‘the Marrakech Agreement’) underlines that sustainable
development is one of the objectives of the organisation.
118 As we have mentioned
above, precautionary principle can be considered a constitutive part of sustainable
development; therefore, it can be argued that the WTO also recognises the importance
of this principle. The link between the WTO and the precautionary principle is clear
from the analysis of one of the WTO Agreements. In fact, the SPS Agreement, even if it
does not use the term ‘precautionary principle’, clearly provides for it.
119
The WTO DSB has dealt with the precautionary principle in two cases: the
Hormones case in 1998
120 and the Asbestos case in 2001.
121 Both cases dealt with
human health issues, but they also provide useful information for disputes in which
human health is accompanied by environmental protection, as in the current GMO
dispute before the WTO.
4.3.1. The Hormones Case
                                                                                                                                              
Agora on International Environmental Law with a presentation titled “Unravelling the Trade and
Environment Debate through Sustainable Development Law Principles”.
118  Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994), preamble, § 1:
“Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services,
while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means
for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development,” Emphasis added.
119 See  supra note 71.
120  Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R: Appellate Body Report: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), 1998.27
The first dispute in which the precautionary principle was mentioned was
decided in 1998 and it dealt with EC measures that prohibited imports from the USA
and Canada of meat treated with hormones for growth purposes. These measures were
considered to be not compatible with Art. 3 of the SPS Agreement.
122 The latter allows
higher sanitary protection than what provided for in international standards but these
measures must be justified by scientific evidence
123 and by a risk assessment.
124
According to the Panel and to the Appellate Body, the EC measures were in breach of
the SPS Agreement because they did not provide for a risk assessment that justified
such measures.
The precautionary principle was a central element of this dispute. One of the
legal issues at stake was to determine whether “the precautionary principle was relevant
in the interpretation of the SPS Agreement”.
125 In order to reach a conclusion on this
point the parties and the WTO addressed the legal nature of the precautionary principle.
On the one hand, according to the EC the principle was already a norm of International
Law. The EC position was as follows:
“The precautionary principle is already, in the view of the European Communities, a
general customary rule of international law or at least a general principle of law, the essence
of which is that it applies not only in the management of a risk, but also in the assessment
thereof.”
126
The EC stressed that the principle is present not only in the management but also
in the assessment of a risk. In other words, the EC considered that the precautionary
principle referred to the implementation of a measure. Therefore, in the Hormones case
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122  In particular see SPS, Art. 3.3.: “Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary
measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by
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Article 5. Notwithstanding the above, all measures which result in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection different from that which would be achieved by measures based on international standards,
guidelines or recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of this Agreement.”
123  In accordance with SPS, Art. 2.2.
124  In accordance with SPS, Art. 5.
125  Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R: Appellate Body Report: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), § 96 (c).
126  Ibid, § 16.28
the EC approach was similar to the current one in the GMO dispute, in which the
principle must also be present in the application of the EC measures.
On the other hand, the US had a completely opposite view about the
precautionary principle. According to its position, it is not a principle but just an
approach:
“The United States does not consider that the "precautionary principle" represents a
principle of customary international law; rather, it may be characterized as an "approach" --
the content of which may vary from context to context.”
127
The US also stressed that the WTO already has pertinent provisions referring to
precaution. Art. 5.7 of the SPS Agreement should not be overruled by provisions
allegedly based on the precautionary principle present in international treaties outside
the WTO.
Canada, the other claimant in this dispute, had an intermediate position. It
maintained that the precautionary principle was not yet a principle of International Law
but it underlined that it might become one:
“The "precautionary principle" should be characterized as the "precautionary approach"
because it has not yet become part of public international law.  Canada considers the
precautionary approach or concept as an emerging principle of international law, which
may in the future crystallize into one of the "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations", within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.”
128
Therefore, Canada did not close the door to a possible crystallisation of the
precautionary principle into a norm of International Law.
How did the WTO approach the legal nature of the precautionary principle? We
could answer that it did not. However, a refusal to answer a question or to deal with an
issue can also provide information. The Appellate Body maintained the following in its
decision:
“(…) The precautionary principle is regarded by some as having crystallized into a general
principle of customary international environmental law.  Whether it has been widely
accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary international law appears less
than clear. We consider, however, that it is unnecessary, and probably imprudent, for the
Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this important, but abstract, question.
We note that the Panel itself did not make any definitive finding with regard to the status of
the precautionary principle in international law and that the precautionary principle, at least
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outside the field of international environmental law, still awaits authoritative
formulation.”
129
The analysis of the Appellate Body’s position leads us to draw two conclusions
on this issue. First, on the one hand the WTO judges did not want to give their opinion
on the legal nature of the precautionary principle. On the other hand, they stressed that
the general acceptance of the principle as a general principle of international law is less
than clear. The wording chosen by the Appellate Body suggests that the WTO agrees
with this last position.
Second, the WTO judges considered that the determination of whether the
precautionary principle is a general principle of international law or not was an abstract
question. We disagree with the Appellate Body reasoning on this point. In fact, if the
legal issue at stake, as we have seen, was to determine if “the precautionary principle
was relevant in the interpretation of the SPS Agreement”;
130 the legal nature of a
principle, which can be applied to a WTO Agreement, is not an abstract question. On
the contrary, a decision in one or in the other direction has a very important practical
implication for the WTO dispute. In the Hormones case the Appellate Body finally
decided that the precautionary principle, as such, could not overrule specific SPS
provisions.
In conclusion, this WTO dispute presented three different approaches to the
legal nature of the precautionary principle: the EC considered it to be already a principle
of International Law; Canada maintained that it might become a principle of
International Law; and the US argued that it was only an approach. The WTO did not
want to deal with this particular issue but the final decision showed that its position was
closer to the US’ one and that it considered the debate on the legal nature of the
precautionary principle to not have any relevant practical consequences.
4.3.2. The Asbestos Case
The second WTO dispute in which the precautionary principle plays an
important role is the Asbestos Case, in which Canada challenged a French ban on
asbestos and asbestos containing products. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body
rejected Canada’s claim and considered the French measure to be consistent with WTO
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law. Even if the challenged measure was not based specifically on the precautionary
principle, the spirit behind the French ban was clearly inspired by it. This decision
reinforced the view that the WTO Agreements support members’ ability to protect
human health and safety at the level of protection they deem appropriate. This could be
valid not only for sanitary measures but also for measures whose objective is the
protection of the environment as well.
The decision in the Asbestos case can be seen as a step forward in the
recognition of the precautionary principle on behalf of the WTO.
4.4. The Precautionary Principle in the GMO Dispute before the WTO
Once clarified the importance of the precautionary principle in the EC GMO
legislation; the evolution of the principle within the international community; and its
consideration in the multilateral trading system; in this section of the paper we will
analyse how the parties in the GMO dispute before the WTO have dealt with the
precautionary principle.
4.4.1. Is the Precautionary Principle an International Law Principle?
The parties in the GMO dispute before the WTO, except Argentina, are the same
ones than in the Hormones case. Not only are the countries the same but also their
position on the legal nature of the precautionary principle has not changed. Furthermore,
the US argues that this case presents similar aspects to the Hormones dispute and that
the Panel should follow the case law therein and not deal with the legal nature of the
precautionary principle.
131 However, the US in its rebuttal submission to the EC first
submission maintains that:
“(…) it strongly disagrees that “precaution” has become a rule of international law. In
particular, the “precautionary principle” cannot be considered a general principle or norm of
international law because it does not have a single, agreed formulation. (…).”
132
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the pertinent WTO provisions.
132  Ibid.31
Therefore, the precautionary principle, according to the US position is not a
principle of International Law because there is no consensus on its formulation. The US
goes one step further and it maintains that, if the precautionary principle is not a general
principle of International Law, it cannot be a rule of customary International Law.
133
On the other hand, the EC disagrees completely with the Complainants position
and it considers the precautionary principle to be a principle of International Law.
134
Furthermore, it considers that this principle is the cornerstone of the Cartagena Protocol,
which is the final result of the international community’s GMO trade regulation efforts.
4.4.2. Do International Law Principles Inform WTO Agreements?
As in the Hormones case, the parties view on the legal nature of the
precautionary principle is very distant. The US underlines, just as it did in the previous
dispute, that it considers the definition of the precautionary principle status a
“theoretical” issue.
135 As discussed above we strongly disagree with this position.
136 In
fact, the answer regarding the status of the precautionary principle must be linked to
another question: do international law principles inform WTO Agreements? The issue is
to determine whether principles of international law may be used in order to interpret
relevant provisions in the WTO agreements. The issue is crucial to the GMO dispute.
Art. 2.3 of the DSU opens the door to the use of public international law rules of
interpretation in the multilateral trading system.
137 Treaty interpretation in international
law is dealt with by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The US considers
that “for the purpose of interpreting the WTO Agreement in accordance with the
principles in Article 31 (3) of the Vienna Convention”
138 the Cartagena Protocol is not a
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135 See  Ibid, § 15.
136 See  supra p.
137  WTO DSU, Art. 2.3.: “The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.  The Members recognize that it
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existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements.” Emphasis added.
138  UN Doc. A/CONF.129/15, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, in
force on January 27, 1980, printed in 25 ILM (1986), at 543; Art. 31.3: “There shall be taken into account,
together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the32
rule of international law because the US is not a party thereof. However, even if it were
a party, the US argues that the Protocol would still not be applicable to the dispute
because, according to its position, it would not “change the rights and obligations under
any existing international agreements.”
139
In sum, the Complainants agree that the WTO can be interpreted through public
international law rules but that these must be present in treaties in which both are
parties. If one is not, then a rule present in the international treaty, in this case the
Cartagena Protocol, cannot be used in order to interpret WTO Agreements. In other
words, according to the Complainants position, the precautionary principle as provided
for in the Cartagena Protocol, cannot be used in order to interpret WTO provisions,
which may be relevant for the decision of the GMO dispute.
On the other hand, the EC reaches a completely opposite conclusion. Firstly, it
argues that the WTO does not live in clinical isolation from International Law.
140
Secondly, it maintains the following:
“There can be no doubt that the WTO agreements (…) must be interpreted and applied by
reference to relevant norms of international law arising outside the WTO context, as
reflected in international agreements and declarations.”
141
The EC stresses that not only can the WTO be interpreted through International Law
norms; but that provisions of the multilateral trading system can also be applied by
reference to such norms. This would mean that the application of a WTO provision can
be based on a norm outside of the multilateral trading system. The EC continues its
reasoning maintaining that:
“(…) the Protocol’s provisions on precaution and risk assessment inform the meaning and
effect of the relevant provisions in the WTO agreements.”
142
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This entails, according to the EC position, that the Cartagena Protocol provisions, which
refer to the precautionary principle, can guide WTO members in the interpretation and
in the application of the precautionary measures provided for in the SPS Agreement.
143
In other words, the EC maintains that public international law norms can be used
in order to interpret and to apply WTO provisions. The precautionary principle present
in the Cartagena Protocol is a rule of international law. Hence, the SPS Agreement
provisions, which refer to the precautionary principle, can be interpreted and applied in
accordance with the Cartagena Protocol’s related provisions.
5. CONCLUSIONS: WILL THE GMO DISPUTE BE A STEP FORWARD OR A STEP BACK IN
THE WTO RECOGNITION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE?
The goal of this paper is not to anticipate possible Panel’s findings in the GMO
dispute. In the paper we have studied the GMO dispute before the WTO and we have
underlined the most important legal issue at stake, which is the role of the precautionary
principle in the application of the EC measures.
144
The analysis of the scope of the dispute demonstrates the importance of the
precautionary principle. If the EC position prevails, the scope of the GMO dispute will
deal with delays in the application of the challenged measures. These delays are due to
the request for further information,
145 which is required because the EC considers that it
does not have enough information to correctly assess the possible adverse risks to
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145  The Complainants consider that the Panel must decide on the WTO consistency of the three EC
challenged measures, despite the fact that they are not present in any official EC document. On the other
hand, the EC argues that the dispute is about the application of the authorisation procedure for the placing
on the market of GMOs and that the Panel should decide whether there have been cases of undue delays
in its implementation.34
human health and to the environment arising from the placing on the market of GMOs.
The request for further information is a measure taken in accordance with the
precautionary principle.
146 Therefore, the scope of the GMO dispute clearly shows the
relevance of the precautionary principle in the controversy.
The main claim of the Complainants is that the EC has violated several SPS
provisions. The EC defends itself maintaining that the challenged measures are justified
under Art. 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. This provision maintains that “in cases where
relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary
or phytosanitary measures”.
147 Even if the provision does not mention the precautionary
principle, measures adopted under Art. 5.7 of the SPS Agreement are clearly based on
it.
The first conclusion of this paper is, therefore, that the scope of the GMO
dispute is to determine whether the EC measures, whose application is based on the
precautionary principle, are justified under Art. 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.
The second conclusion of this paper refers to the role that the GMO dispute can
play in the ongoing trade and environment debate.
On the one hand, in order to reach a conclusion on the consistency of the
challenged measures with the WTO, the EC considers that the Panel can use
International Law norms in order to interpret WTO provisions. Furthermore, the EC
argues that the application of multilateral trading system provisions can be informed by
International Law norms and that the Cartagena Protocol is the most advanced rule of
International Law about trade in GMOs. It concludes that the Panel can seek advice in
the Cartagena Protocol provisions that deal with the precautionary principle in order to
interpret Art. 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, when deciding if the EC measures are justified
under that provision. On the other hand, the Complainants deny such possibility. They
understand that WTO provisions can be informed by pertinent International Law norms
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but they do not agree that the Cartagena Protocol can play such a role in the GMO
dispute because they are not parties therein.
On the other hand, the WTO Appellate Body case law on the precautionary
principle has evolved. In the Hormones case it did not consider that International Law
rules could overrule the SPS Agreement provisions and it maintained that general
acceptance of the precautionary principle as a norm of International Law was less than
clear. On the contrary, in the Asbestos case the Appellate Body changed direction and
decided in favour of a measure inspired by the precautionary principle.
Therefore, the second conclusion of this paper is that, depending on how the
Panel will undertake the study of the EC challenged measures in respect to Art. 5.7 of
the SPS Agreement, the WTO recognition of the precautionary principle can make a
step forward or a step back.
If the Panel decides to take into account provisions regarding the precautionary
principle from outside the WTO in order to interpret the SPS Agreement, this will mean
that the multilateral trading system is opening itself to other fields of international law
that can inform the WTO when disputes deal with issues which are not only trade
related, but that may also deal with human health, environmental or, for example, labour
related concerns. This would be very important for the ongoing trade and environment
debate. On the other hand, if the Panel does not take into account international law
norms in order to interpret the SPS Agreement, it would entail a negative signal. The
WTO would isolate itself from the rest of International Law and public opinion
criticism would probably increase.
In conclusion, the GMO dispute will demonstrate if the WTO is ready to take a
step forward in the recognition of the precautionary principle, and of environmental and
social concerns in general.
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